表1 改革时间线 / Table 1 · Reform timeline
| 阶段 Phase | 服务费机制 Service-fee mechanism | 基本工资 Basic | 结果与问题 Outcomes & issues |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-12 前 | 不收取 None | 高于 UMK | 无服务费收入,薪酬无竞争力 / no SC income, uncompetitive |
| 2025-12 | 收取,95% 当月全额分配 | 下调至 UMK | 员工实发大增;GOP 上升(服务费过手账 + 基本工资降);产出与分配不匹配(用工少却分完全池) |
| 2026-1 起 | UMK + KPI(废止全额分配) | UMK | 服务质量不达标·公区卫生忽略·低效加班·店长倚重 OTA;一线员工激励不对称(淡季负相关强、旺季正相关弱) |
| 2026-H2 | 本次修订(见表2) | UMK + 单独约定 | 聚焦服务质量与健康可持续 / focus on quality & sustainability |
表2 2026 年下半年修订方向 / Table 2 · H2 2026 revision directions
| # | 措施 Measure | 对应 Sec. |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 增设 W1 基础服务质量服务费(定额 + 刚性),回归服务费本义 | §4 / §5 |
| 2 | 发放池绑定渠道佣金成本 = (营收 − 渠道成本) × 9.5% | §2 |
| 3 | 明确正式岗位定义;DW / Trainee 管理下放店总(高峰/淡季/应急增缩编),优秀 DW 可转正 | §4 |
| 4 | 总池结余 → 1号位年度/半年度激励,引导健康客源结构(会员) | §7 |
| 5 | 8 维 KPI,1号位到全员分担,随月度发放池走——净营收越高 KPI 越值钱 | §3 / §6 |
| 6 | 刚性服务质量标准,1号位到全员分担,只扣不减,严重触发警告信 | §5 |
以下第一章起为上述方向的具体规则。 / Sections 1 onward set out the detailed rules.
依印尼法律,服务费按 95% 员工工资 / 3% loss and breakage(损耗与破损)/ 2% welfare(员工福利)分配;其中 95% 员工工资份额须全额发放完毕,建议以自然年为单位结清。任何蓄水/结转须经 PKB/工会同意并透明公示,不构成对个人的固定承诺。
Under Indonesian law, the service charge is split 95% employee wages / 3% loss and breakage / 2% welfare; the 95% employee-wage share must be fully paid out, ideally closed within each natural year. Any reserve/carryover requires PKB/union agreement and transparent disclosure, and is not a fixed commitment to any individual.
法律依据(待本地法务核验 / subject to local legal review):
THR 执行口径:THR 仅以基本工资为基数计发;基础服务质量服务费工资、KPI 服务费工资均为浮动项,不计入 THR。
THR practice: THR is calculated on basic salary only; both the Base Service-Quality Service-Fee and the KPI Service-Fee are floating and excluded from THR.
用于当月发放「基础服务质量服务费工资」+「KPI 服务费工资」的总池子,随渠道结构浮动。
浮动杠杆 / Incentive lever:高佣金率渠道(OTA 等)→ 渠道成本高 → 池子小;直销/低佣金渠道 → 渠道成本低 → 池子大。
High-commission channels raise channel cost and shrink the pool; direct/low-commission channels lower cost and grow the pool.
店总目标:降低高佣金渠道依赖、提升直销占比——既做大蛋糕,又做优质、良性、可持续的客源成分。
GM objective: reduce reliance on high-commission channels and raise the direct-sales share — growing the cake while improving the quality and sustainability of guest sources.
口径说明(重要):「减去渠道成本」指从营收基数中扣 OTA 后再 ×9.5%,而非从 9.5% 池子里扣。因 OTA 佣金占营收 16~24%,大于 9.5% 池子本身,后者会让每月池子变负。
"Subtracting channel cost" means deducting OTA from the revenue base before applying 9.5% — not subtracting OTA from the 9.5% pool. OTA commissions (16–24% of revenue) exceed the 9.5% pool, so the latter would turn the pool negative every month.
高表现月份全员拿更多,低表现月份全员拿更少——酒店全员与酒店业绩结成利益共同体。
In high-performance months everyone earns more, in low-performance months less — all staff share a community of interest with the hotel's performance.
工资三层:W0 基本工资(THR 以此计发)| W1 基础服务质量服务费(刚性·专门用来扣,达标拿满、每项 −5% 封顶 50%、重大违规清零,见§5)| W2 KPI 服务费(浮动池,见§3)。W1 月标准即 KPI 分配权重(同阶);1号位例外:W1 刚性基数 25,KPI 分配权重上浮至 30(反映 8 维 KPI 全责,补充其月度重分配下降)。单位 m = juta Rp。
W0 basic (THR basis) | W1 Base Service-Quality Fee (rigid, deductible, see §5) | W2 KPI fee (floating, see §3). W1 standard = KPI weight, except the GM: W1 rigid base 25, KPI weight raised to 30 (reflecting full 8-dim KPI responsibility). Unit: m = juta Rp.
表3 岗位工资结构 / Table 3 · Position salary structure
| 岗位 Position | W0 基本工资 Basic | W1 月标准 (=KPI权重) m | W2 KPI 服务费 | 排班 Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1号位 GM | UMK 基准¹ | 25 | 池内分配·权重 25 | 做6休1 |
| 2/3号位 副总/储备 Deputy/Reserve | UMK 基准¹ | 12.5 | 池内·12.5 | 做6休1 |
| 前厅领班 FO Lead | UMK 基准 | 5 | 池内·5 | 做6休1 |
| 维修领班 ENG Lead | UMK 基准 | 4 | 池内·4 | 做5休2 |
| 房务/餐饮领班 HK·Cook Lead | UMK 基准 | 4 | 池内·4 | 做6休1 |
| 前厅前台 FO Staff | UMK 基准 | 3 | 池内·3 | 做6休1 |
| 公区正式工 PA Staff(如有) | UMK 基准 | 3 | 池内·3 | 做6休1 |
| 工程员工 Engineering Staff(正式) | UMK 基准 | 0 | 计件·多劳多得² | 做5休2 |
| 房务/餐饮员工 HK·F&B Staff(正式) | UMK 基准 | 0 | 计件·多劳多得² | 做6休1 |
| DW | 日薪 | 0 | 计件·多劳多得² | — |
| Intern | — | 0 | 0 | — |
| 月度 W1 合计(标准编制)/ Monthly W1 total | CP = 78m · BSD = 78m · Airport = 82m(CP、BSD 无 Cook Lead,早餐外包) | |||
W1 适用范围 / W1 scope:仅 ① 前三号位 + 前厅领班及所有前厅人员;② 维修/房务/餐饮领班;③ 公区正式工(如有)。房务/工程/餐饮员工(正式或 DW)为「基本工资 + 计件 KPI」,无 W1。
W1 applies only to: ① top-3 + FO Lead & all FO staff; ② ENG/HK/Cook Leads; ③ PA formal (if any). HK/Eng/F&B staff (formal or DW) are 'basic + piece-rate KPI', no W1.
注¹ W0 基本工资为按 UMK 校准的金额(非等同 UMK),按地区:CP 5.8 / Airport 5.4 / BSD 5.25;单独约定从其合同。 注² 计件属 KPI 范畴(见附件C);须先符合刚性标准,再按计件单价 × 完成量多劳多得,不达标从计件扣。
Notes: ¹ W0 is UMK-calibrated (not exactly UMK), by region (CP 5.8 / Airport 5.4 / BSD 5.25); individual contracts prevail. ² Piece-rate is a KPI item (Annex C); meet rigid standards first, then earn by piece-rate.
表4 特殊约定人员(固定·不随 KPI 浮动,共3人)/ Table 4 · Individually-contracted (fixed, 3 people)
| 人员 Person | 岗位 Role | 固定内容 Fixed terms |
|---|---|---|
| Head of Revenue | CP 1+2号位 | 基本 10m (8+2) + W1 固定 25m(前3月 20m)+ KPI 上限 5m(前3月 10m);不进 W2 池 |
| Marvin | Airport 1号位(中) | 年包 25 万 RMB ÷ 12 折算 − 基本 5.8m,余额固定服务费;不进 W2 池 |
| Stan Wei | CP 3号位(中) | 月 17,600 RMB 折算 − 基本 5.8m,余额固定服务费;不进 W2 池 |
Contracted roles' W1 + KPI are priority draws deducted from the distributable pool first; they do not participate in the W2 pool-share (see Annex C).
模型之外 / Outside the standard model:上述 3 人按既有合同固定发放,不参与 W1/W2 池内分配,其固定服务费作为「优先扣项」先从发放池扣除,剩余才是标准编制员工「实际可分」的 W2 池。此安排可接受——体系已设「优秀 DW 可转正」通道,特殊约定人员即此通道的既成案例,并非制度缺口。
These three are paid per existing contracts and sit outside the standard W1/W2 pool-share; their fixed fees are priority draws, and the residual is the actually-distributable W2 pool for standard staff. Acceptable — the framework already allows outstanding DW to convert to formal staff, and these contracted terms are existing cases of that pathway, not a gap.
测算结论:对照附件 A 真实数据,15 个店月 KPI 池全部为正,上述标准每月均能覆盖,不算偏高,可予采用。
Per Annex A, all 15 store-month KPI pools positive; standards covered every month — not too high, can be adopted.
原则:只扣不减——刚性标准未达标即按比例扣减当月 W1 基础服务质量服务费,达标不额外奖励;从1号位到全员分别承担全部或相关部分。
Deduction only, never reduction: missing a rigid standard deducts from that month's W1 proportionally; meeting it earns no extra. Borne wholly or partly by everyone from the GM down.
重大情形:四大安全/合规的重大情形 → 基础服务质量服务费清零 + 触发警告信 + 提报升级处理(解除/降星/扣季度绩效),依 PP/PKB 正当程序。触及 50% 封顶通常意味着应更换该岗位负责人。
In major safety/compliance cases the Base Service-Quality Service-Fee is fully forfeited and the matter is escalated for disciplinary action (dismissal/downgrade/quarterly-performance deduction) per PP/PKB due process. Reaching the 50% cap usually indicates the position holder should be replaced.
| 维度 Dimension | 分值 Pts | 目标 / 口径 Target / Definition |
|---|---|---|
| 月百房售卡达标率 | 15 | 5 张/百房/日 |
| 月本人订住收佣 OCC 达标率 | 15 | 目标占比 55% |
| 日 OCC 落位率 | 15 | 92–98%(近95%) |
| 月神灯 AI 活跃率 | 15 | 目标 50% |
| 月 RevPAR 完成率 | 10 | 对目标/预算完成率 |
| 月企业卡激活达标率 | 10 | 目标 = 房量 ÷ 3(每卡会员 ≥10) |
| 平台点评分达标率 | 10 | 六平台均分 ≥4.7 |
| 神灯 AI 运营人才培养 | 10 | 由运营总监根据培训与认证开展情况主观评分 |
| 合计 Total | 100 | — |
KPI 维度选取规则:2/3号位、领班、员工的 KPI 不另设框架,从上述1号位8维度中挑选与本人岗位相关的部分,权重由店总按月团队管理重点灵活设定,合计100。
Deputy/Reserve, Leads, Staff do not use a separate framework — they select a relevant subset of the GM's 8 dimensions; weights set by GM monthly, summing to 100.
示例:前台系挑「售卡·收佣OCC·企业卡·平台点评分·神灯AI」;房务/工程主要挑「平台点评分 + 刚性底线」;餐饮挑「平台点评分(食评) + 刚性底线」。DW 走计件,不适用此8维度。
E.g. FO: card sales / commission OCC / corporate card / rating / AI; HK & Eng: rating + rigid baseline; F&B: rating (food) + rigid baseline. DW use piece-rate.
直营店 / Direct-operated
年度或半年度 GOP 激励规则由直营管理部设计,从当年剩余服务费总池分配。
Annual/semi-annual rules by the Direct-Operations Management Dept; from the year's remaining pool.
管理店 / Managed
同样从服务费总池分配;若超出服务费池,业主可额外奖励团队(类似「奖励管理费」,但奖励对象是团队而非管理公司)。
Also from the pool; where it exceeds, the owner may reward the team.
导向:以结余激励引导1号位减少为短期业绩牺牲服务质量的行为,做更健康的客源结构(会员)。
Intent: steer the GM away from short-termism that sacrifices quality, toward a healthier member-based guest mix.
GM 年度口径(重要):月度测算中 GM 的 W1+W2 因重分配而较旧制 GOP 制下降,但这并非 GM 的全年损失——超封顶结余(附件B cap 以上部分)按§7 作 GM 年度/半年度激励发放,月度少拿的部分年底补回甚至超出。
Annual view: the GM's monthly W1+W2 may dip versus the old GOP-based pay, but the above-cap surplus (Annex B) is paid out as the GM's annual/semi-annual incentive (§7) — the monthly shortfall is recovered or exceeded at year-end.
1–5月实测(理论口径):CP 净结余 33.8m ≈ GM 月度损失 32.4m(Desly 年度基本补平);BSD 净结余 24.2m > GM 损失 12.4m(Junius 年度净 +11.8m);Airport 净结余 14.5m(无标准 GM,作全员年终 KPI 奖)。1–5月均未触发 below-floor。
Jan–May (theoretical): CP net surplus 33.8m ≈ GM monthly loss 32.4m (Desly roughly whole); BSD 24.2m > 12.4m (Junius net +11.8m); Airport 14.5m (no standard GM → staff year-end bonus).
| 维度 Dimension | 2号位 副总 Deputy | 3号位 储备/店助 Reserve |
|---|---|---|
| 月百房售卡达标率 | — | — |
| 月本人订住收佣 OCC 达标率 | — | — |
| 日 OCC 落位率 | — | — |
| 月神灯 AI 活跃率 | — | — |
| 月 RevPAR 完成率 | — | — |
| 月企业卡激活达标率 | — | — |
| 平台点评分达标率 | — | — |
| 神灯 AI 运营人才培养 | — | — |
| 合计 Total | 100 | 100 |
说明:2/3号位各维度权重不固定,由店总根据当月团队管理重点灵活设定,各项合计 100。越往下越偏触点执行(售卡/收佣/激活/人才),越少战略获客(OCC落位/企业卡)。
Note: weights are not fixed — the GM sets them each month based on team-management priorities, summing to 100. Lower tiers lean toward front-line execution; less on strategic acquisition.
重大事项提报 DGI 管理委员会。
Major matters are escalated to the DGI Management Committee.
单位 m = 百万印尼盾。发放池 = (营收 − OTA成本) × 9.5%;KPI池 = 发放池 − 该店 W1 合计。数据为 2026 年 1–5 月(6 月未含)。Unit: million Rp. Pool = (Revenue − OTA Cost) × 9.5%; KPI Pool = Pool − W1 total. Data: Jan–May 2026 (Jun not included).
| 店 Store | 月 | 营收 Revenue | OTA成本 | 净营收 Net | 发放池 Pool | W1合计 Base | KPI池 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CP | 1月 | 1,640.7 | 264.1 | 1,376.6 | 130.8 | 78 | 52.8 |
| CP | 2月 | 1,348.7 | 255.6 | 1,093.1 | 103.8 | 78 | 25.8 |
| CP | 3月 | 1,631.7 | 379.5 | 1,252.2 | 119.0 | 78 | 41.0 |
| CP | 4月 | 2,004.5 | 425.2 | 1,579.3 | 150.0 | 78 | 72.0 |
| CP | 5月 | 2,258.7 | 365.8 | 1,892.9 | 179.8 | 78 | 101.8 |
| BSD | 1月 | 1,202.1 | 235.0 | 967.1 | 91.9 | 78 | 13.9 |
| BSD | 2月 | 1,255.3 | 275.5 | 979.7 | 93.1 | 78 | 15.1 |
| BSD | 3月 | 1,609.2 | 391.9 | 1,217.4 | 115.6 | 78 | 37.6 |
| BSD | 4月 | 1,566.0 | 383.0 | 1,183.0 | 112.4 | 78 | 34.4 |
| BSD | 5月 | 1,648.0 | 382.7 | 1,265.3 | 120.2 | 78 | 42.2 |
| Airport | 1月 | 1,468.4 | 301.2 | 1,167.2 | 110.9 | 82 | 28.9 |
| Airport | 2月 | 1,339.1 | 340.0 | 999.1 | 94.9 | 82 | 12.9 |
| Airport | 3月 | 1,359.3 | 305.7 | 1,053.6 | 100.1 | 82 | 18.1 |
| Airport | 4月 | 1,574.1 | 343.0 | 1,231.2 | 117.0 | 82 | 35.0 |
| Airport | 5月 | 1,657.2 | 335.7 | 1,321.6 | 125.5 | 82 | 43.5 |
KPI池配色:绿 ≥30 黄 15–30 红 <15(淡季偏薄)
① 15 个店月 KPI 池全部为正,W1 合计(CP·BSD 78m / Airport 82m)每月均能覆盖,标准不算偏高,可予采用。
All 15 store-month KPI pools are positive; W1 totals covered every month — not too high, can be adopted.
② CP 最宽裕(KPI池 26~102m,均值约 59m);BSD 旺季 34~42m、Airport 旺季 35~44m 健康;淡季(1~2月)BSD 13.9~15.1m、Airport 12.9m 偏薄——即「低表现月全员少拿」的浮动效果,非标准过高。
CP most comfortable (26–102m, avg ~59m); BSD and Airport healthy in peak (34–44m) but thin in low season (BSD 13.9–15.1m, Airport 12.9m) — the intended float, not over-pricing.
③ 建议:Airport 淡季 KPI 池偏薄,可设小额蓄水缓冲(旺季结余回补淡季),与「自然年发放完毕」原则吻合。
Recommendation: set a small reserve buffer for Airport low-season KPI pools, consistent with the natural-year full-distribution principle.
原则:既做淡季保底,也做旺季封顶——以蓄水池为媒介,把旺季超封顶部分回补给淡季低于保底的部分,平滑全员月度 KPI 收入,年度结清。
Both a low-season floor and a peak-season cap apply: a reserve mediates — surpluses above the cap refill shortfalls below the floor, smoothing monthly KPI income, with annual closure.
| 店 Store | 保底 Floor (m) | 封顶 Cap (m) | 参考依据 Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| CP | 25 | 70 | 实测 24~102,淡季守下限、旺季留结余 |
| BSD | 10 | 30 | 实测 12~42,淡季保底、旺季封顶回补 |
| Airport | 12 | 32 | 实测 10~44,淡季保底、旺季封顶回补 |
可持续性约束:Floor/Cap 为建议起步值,可按每店年度预算与淡旺季节律调整;Cap 须高于 Floor,且单店全年「Cap 以上累计」应能覆盖「Floor 以下累计」缺口,否则保底不可持续。
Sustainability: Floor/Cap are starting values; Cap must exceed Floor, and annual above-Cap surplus must cover below-Floor shortfall.
治理:蓄水池由店总按月计提与释放,运营财务复核,季度向员工公示余额;重大调整须报直营管理部并经 PKB/工会确认。
Governance: reserve accrued/released monthly by GM, reconciled by finance, disclosed quarterly; material adjustments require Direct-Ops + PKB/union confirmation.
算例(标准编制,全员 100 分;U = W2池 ÷ Σ KPI权重,Σ权重 = W1合计 78 + 1号位上浮 5 = 83;GM KPI = 30 × U,月入 = W1(25) + KPI):注:本算例用简化口径 W2 = 发放池 − W1合计(未扣 contracted 固定费与 DW 计件),仅示分配机制;按「实际可分」口径的逐人测算见附件 D。
| 店·月 | 发放池 | W1合计 | W2池 | U | GM KPI | GM月入 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CP 5月(旺季) | 179.8m | 78m | 101.8m | 1.227 | 36.8m | 61.8m |
| CP 2月(淡季) | 103.8m | 78m | 25.8m | 0.311 | 9.3m | 34.3m |
| BSD 5月(旺季) | 120.2m | 78m | 42.2m | 0.508 | 15.3m | 40.3m |
| BSD 1月(淡季) | 91.9m | 78m | 13.9m | 0.168 | 5.0m | 30.0m |
旺季 U>1(KPI>基础),淡季 U<1(KPI<基础);contracted 岗及 DW 不在此表。1号位 KPI 权重 30 > W1 基数 25(解耦),故 GM 月入 = 25 + 30×U。
方法论:以每店当月实际发掉的服务费总额为池,减去不动部分(DW/实习生/产出岗计件 + 3 个 contracted 固定费),剩余在 W1 适用岗间按 W1 标准 × 入职比例 重分配(1号位 KPI 权重 30)。基础工资 W0 不变;假设全员 100 分(达标)。明细见 新旧对比测算.csv(492 行)。
Method: take each store's actual monthly service-fee spend, subtract unchanged items (DW/intern/output piece-rate + 3 contracted fixed fees), redistribute the residual among W1-eligible roles by W1 standard × hire-date proration (GM KPI weight 30). W0 basic unchanged; all staff assumed at 100 (on-target). Details in 新旧对比测算.csv (492 rows).
表D-1 每店每月重分配倍数 U(U = 实际可分 W2 池 ÷ W1 新标准合计)
| 店 Store | 1月 | 2月 | 3月 | 4月 | 5月 | 6月 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CP | 0.79 | 0.50 | 0.57 | 1.07 | 0.90 | 1.42 |
| BSD | 0.52 | 0.23 | 0.73 | 0.61 | 0.15 | 0.73 |
| Airport | 0.75 | −0.19 | 0.27 | 0.09 | −0.07 | 0.07 |
U>0:W1 标准之上还有 KPI 可发;U<0:当月实际池撑不住 W1 标准(淡季,由附件 B 蓄水缓冲)。6月三店均入旺季(CP 1.42 最强)。
表D-2 增益最大 Top5(6个月差额合计)
| 人 | 店 | 角色 | 差额 m |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shelly Yanuari | Airport | 销售(2/3号位) | +17.6 |
| Ferry Pratama | CP | 前厅领班 | +14.5 |
| Daniel Nicholas | Airport | 前厅前台 | +13.9 |
| Maman Surahman | CP | 维修领班 | +11.3 |
| Aidah Dianasari | BSD | 前厅领班 | +7.7 |
表D-3 下降最大 Top5(6个月差额合计)
| 人 | 店 | 角色 | 差额 m |
|---|---|---|---|
| Desly Halomoan | CP | GM | −30.0 |
| Shinta Putri | Airport | 前厅前台 | −9.6 |
| Fionitta Priscillia | BSD | 前厅前台 | −7.2 |
| Dava Putri | Airport | 前厅前台 | −7.2 |
| Indah Zahra | Airport | 前厅前台 | −7.0 |
GM 年度由 §7 补平:Desly 1–6月月度 −30.0m + CP §7 结余(1–5月理论 33.8m,6月旺季再增)→ 全年净正;Junius 1–6月月度 −4.4m + BSD §7 结余 24.2m → 全年净 +19.8m 以上。GM 月度重分配下降由 §7 年度/半年度激励补回甚至超出。
GMs made whole annually via §7: Desly Jan–Jun monthly −30.0m + CP §7 surplus (Jan–May theoretical 33.8m, plus June peak) → net positive; Junius −4.4m + BSD §7 24.2m → net +19.8m+. The monthly dip is recovered or exceeded at year-end.
结论:新制将旧制下偏高 GM 与高绩效前台的份额,重分给原本偏低的领班与 2/3 号位(纠偏);DW/产出岗/contracted 不动;GM 月度下降由 §7 年度补平。假设全员 100 分,实际分数会上下调节 W2。
Conclusion: the new system redistributes from over-paid GMs and high-achiever FO to under-paid leads and 2/3-tier roles (correction); DW/output/contracted unchanged; GM monthly dip recovered via §7 annual incentive. Assumes all at 100; actual scores modulate W2.